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Alongside consolidation and globalisation of the ﬁ  nancial markets, the increase in values exchanged 
in payment and settlement systems has been remarkable. The size of intraday liquidity requested to expedite 
settlement of such values is accordingly very signiﬁ  cant, especially compared to overnight or longer term liquidity.
The increasing use of risk control arrangements in payment and settlement systems (e.g. real-time gross 
settlement) is typically associated with higher liquidity needs, which have been balanced by the parallel 
development of several forms of liquidity saving features in systems. 
The most remarkable developments have affected the qualitative management of intraday liquidity. A clear 
trend illustrated by continuous linked settlement (CLS) is the shortening of the time horizon in intraday 
liquidity management. 
On the “supply” side, intraday liquidity can be provided by central banks or commercial banks, depending 
on the settlement asset used by systems. Since most central banks extend credit only against collateral, 
the type of assets that participants can use is an important factor in determining the opportunity costs 
of intra-day liquidity. In the past decade, most central banks have substantially broadened the range of 
collateral they accept in their provision of liquidity. Furthermore, an interbank intraday liquidity market 
seems to start emerging in relation with concentration of correspondent banking activities and funding 
costs related to critical time windows.
Developments affecting intraday liquidity management need to be adequately considered from a ﬁ  nancial 
stability perspective. 
Liquidity risk proﬁ  le has changed alongside a variety of factors including consolidation which has led to 
a concentration of intraday liquidity risk and the development of interdependencies in payment and 
settlement systems.
One lesson to be drawn from the recent period is the usefulness for  central banks, to have a list of eligible 
assets that is diversiﬁ  ed enough to address an unexpected increase in collateral demand, in order to 
mitigate the consequences of a ﬁ  nancial turmoil.
Over the past decade, the relevant actors, including the banking sector, central banks and the banking 
supervisors have taken various initiatives to better approach the diverse challenges raised by developments 
in intraday liquidity. Central bank policy responses encompass the provision of new settlement services 
which allow to optimize intraday liquidity management of banks (e.g. the new TARGET2 platform), the 
adaptation of their collateral policy to the new landscape of interdependent payment systems and oversight 
initiatives to better monitor and address changing risks.ARTICLES
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L
iquidity is usually deﬁ  ned as the ability for 
a ﬁ  nancial institution to fund increases in 
assets and meet obligations as they come due. 
Liquidity has to be considered within different time 
horizons, depending on the respective maturity of 
obligations and assets used to fulﬁ  l these obligations. 
Intraday liquidity is the shortest time horizon of 
the overall liquidity of a said institution. It can be 
referred to as the funds which are available or can be 
borrowed during the business day in order to enable 
ﬁ  nancial institutions to effect payments/settlements. 
Intra-day liquidity has different sources: incoming 
funds and intraday credit, i.e. the credit extended by 
the settlement agent of the system and reimbursed 
within a single business day (also called “daylight 
credit”). The provision of intraday credit is aimed at 
ensuring a smooth settlement process and avoiding 
gridlocks situations in the system. It allows to mitigate 
the effects of any hazard in sequencing payment 
ﬂ  ows in the system. Repayment of the borrowed 
funds should take place before the end of the business 
day, otherwise there is spillover to overnight credit.
Structural developments in the ﬁ  nancial industry 
have led in the past years to a clear trend in 
shortening time horizon of liquidity risk and liquidity 
management. One practitioner recently summarised 
the situation as follows: “my short-term is intraday, 
my medium-term is overnight and my long-term is 
one week”. 
This evolution has notably been driven by changes in 
the use and in the patterns of payment and settlement 
systems. Actually, alongside consolidation and 
globalisation of the ﬁ  nancial markets, the increase 
in values exchanged in payment and settlement 
systems has been very dynamic in the recent years. 
For instance, every day in France, EUR 500 billion 
are exchanged through large-value payment systems, 
which represent 30% of the country’s annual GDP. 
Furthermore, the widespread use of real-time 
settlement as a way to expedite settlement in payment 
and securities systems has been an important change 
in the last decade in most countries. 
Liquidity risk is usually deﬁ  ned as the risk of not 
being able to meet payment obligations when due. 
However, the increasing use of payment and 
settlement systems and the evolution of these 
systems towards real-time settlement practices have 
created a new situation, with payment obligations 
falling due much quicker than in the past.
Another important trend is the growing importance 
of collateralisation as a risk mitigation technique, 
especially in payment and settlement systems. 
Addressing intraday liquidity related issues requires 
considering at the same time issues related to 
collateral management.
The objective of this article is to address changes 
which have affected intraday liquidity management 
and the implications of these changes for ﬁ  nancial 
stability, including an overview of preliminary 
lessons drawn from the recent period of market 
turbulences. 
1|   CHANGES IN INTRADAY 
LIQUIDITY MANAGEMENT
Recent changes in intraday liquidity management 
have affected both the demand and the supply sides.
1|1  Evolution of intraday liquidity needs
Some developments can be categorised as constraining 
the amount of intraday liquidity necessary to 
ensure smooth functioning of settlement systems 
while other factors are rather inﬂ  uencing the way 
intra-day liquidity is managed in qualitative terms 
by participants in systems.
WIDESPREAD USE OF RISK CONTROL MEASURES 
HAS INCREASED THE QUANTITATIVE INTRADAY 
LIQUIDITY NEEDS
Over the past decade, the features of payment and 
settlement systems have signiﬁ  cantly evolved. 
The ﬁ  rst crucial evolution which has inﬂ  uenced 
intraday liquidity needs is the progress in the 
implementation of some standard practices of risk 
control measures in payment and settlement systems. 
The stronger emphasis on risk management in the 
design of market infrastructure has been reﬂ  ected in 
the shift towards real-time gross settlement (RTGS) 
in large-value payments and delivery versus 
payment (DVP) in securities settlement, which are 
typically associated with higher liquidity pressures. ARTICLES
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The ﬁ  rst example is the implementation in most 
countries of RTGS systems, which have become the 
standard model of large value payment system (LVPS), 
progressively replacing deferred net settlement (DNS) 
systems (see  paragraph  2|1, Changing forms of 
liquidity risk).
DNS systems were the predominant form of payment 
systems in the 1980s. They are usually deﬁ  ned as 
providing settlement on a net basis at the end of 
a predeﬁ  ned settlement cycle, typically at the end 
of the business day.
By reducing the number and overall value of 
payments between ﬁ  nancial institutions, netting 
minimises the usage of settlement asset. However, 
a drawback of DNS systems is the higher settlement 
risks involved, in particular since the ﬁ  nality is not 
reached immediately but late in the day.
In contrast with DNS systems, RTGS systems settle 
each payment individually (i.e. on a gross basis). 
Provided the payer has sufﬁ  cient balances (or credit 
availability), each payment order is settled as soon as 
it enters the system (i.e. on a real-time basis). When 
the payer’s funds are insufﬁ  cient, the order is typically 
queued. RTGS systems provide the advantage that 
payments become ﬁ  nal in the course of the day. The 
adoption of such safer systems was strongly supported 
and often initiated by central banks. A common 
side affect of settlement in RTGS mode is that the 
associated intraday liquidity needs required to settle 
an equivalent of underlying payment obligations are 
higher than in a DNS environment. The number of 
RTGS systems has increased dramatically in the 1990s.1 
Comparable evolution has taken place in the 
securities settlement environment where DVP 
model 1 has also expanded signiﬁ  cantly in the past 
ten years. In contrast with model 2 and model 3 DVP, 
model 1 DVP implies that the delivery of the securities 
leg of a transaction is processed on a gross basis as 
well as the settlement of the related cash obligation.2 
This evolution has taken place as a way to improve 
ﬁ  nal settlement and to accelerate both re-delivery of 
securities and re-use of the cash settlement proceeds. 
One signiﬁ  cant illustration of this trend in expanding 
the use of DVP model 1 is the implementation under 
course of the Euroclear group’s business model 
aimed at further integrating securities settlement. 
The so-called Euroclear settlement of Euronext-zone 
securities (ESES) project will lead to the creation of 
a single platform allowing for multi-central bank 
settlement in real time of securities deposited in 
Euroclear Belgium, Euroclear France and Euroclear 
Nederland. The ESES project has been implemented 
at Euroclear France in November 2007 and is due 
to be rolled out at Euroclear Belgium and Euroclear 
Nederland in 2008. It will entail in the three central 
securities depositories (CSDs) the decommissioning 
of the model 2 DVP systems currently used to expedite 
a large part of the volume of settlement of securities 
transactions. All transactions will accordingly be 
processed under a DVP model 1 basis. This change 
reﬂ  ects the market demand for intraday ﬁ  nality.
Key implications of all these developments are the 
more complex liquidity management requirements 
faced by banks accessing the infrastructure, and the 
growing importance of collateralisation to support 
liquidity demand.
DEVELOPMENT OF INNOVATIVE LIQUIDITY SAVING 
FEATURES IN PAYMENT AND SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS
Opposite offsetting factors have recently developed 
in order to save liquidity and collateral associated 
with the widespread design of risk control measures 
in payment and settlement systems. 
In order to respond to concerns expressed regarding 
the costs associated with RTGS and DVP model 1 
in securities settlement, mechanisms have been 
introduced to allow participants to economise on 
liquidity needs. Concerns relate primarily to the added 
opportunity costs for payment system participants 
due to the higher amount of intraday liquidity needed 
to expedite settlement on a gross basis compared 
to net settlement. In extreme circumstances, the 
possibility for shortages of liquidity may emerge 
with the potential to generate signiﬁ  cant disruption 
in payment systems. 
These concerns have led the market to push LVPSs 
to introduce liquidity-saving features, including 
offsetting algorithms and the combination of 
1  See BIS (1997): “Real-time gross settlement systems”, March.
2  See the three different models of DVP identiﬁ  ed in the report entitled Delivery versus payment in securities settlement systems, published by the Bank for 
International Settlements in 1992 (http://www.bis.org).ARTICLES
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bilateral or multilateral netting with real-time 
settlement functionality (for instance, CHIPS in the 
United States, TARGET2 in the EU). Technological 
advance and legal changes have facilitated the 
introduction of these liquidity-saving features 
without reintroducing the kind of uncertainties 
and risks which characterised the DNS systems.
Associated to these developments, most LVPSs 
now provide their users with a broader range of 
real-time information and more ﬂ  exibility to manage 
liquidity. Such controls include, for instance, the 
possibility to change the order of a payment in the 
queue, the intended settlement time or bilateral 
and multilateral credit limits to control the outﬂ  ow 
of funds.
Actually, progress in the design of LVPSs now 
allows the banks to obtain earlier ﬁ  nality with a 
fewer amount of settlement asset needed at a lower 
cost. With a lower consumption of settlement asset, 
banks can make the same amount of payments with 
fewer settlement balances. Thus, the costs of making 
payments are lower. Where applied, liquidity saving 
features have signiﬁ  cantly alleviated the liquidity 
burden on system participants, thereby relaxing 
potential collateral constraints.
Another example is the automated self-collateralisation 
procedures in securities settlement systems. Several 
CSDs of the Euroclear group (Euroclear France and 
Euroclear UK and Ireland) have liquidity-saving 
mechanisms that facilitate real-time DVP. Securities 
in the course of being purchased can be used as 
collateral for intra-day credit in order to fund the 
purchase. Monte Titoli in Italy and Iberclear in Spain 
use comparable arrangements.
In designing payment and settlement systems, a 
certain trade-off exists between on the one hand 
achieving early ﬁ  nality and thus lower risks and 
on the other hand economising on settlement asset 
and thus lower costs. While this trade-off remains, a 
better risk-cost equilibrium has been made possible 
by the development of these advanced liquidity 
saving features. In quantitative terms, the parallel 
development of liquidity saving features in systems 
has allowed to limit to a large extent the higher 
liquidity needs due to the implementation of risk 
control measures relying on gross settlement.
FACTORS INFLUENCING THE QUALITATIVE 
MANAGEMENT OF INTRADAY LIQUIDITY
One of the main remarkable developments of the 
recent years has been the increasing time criticality 
of the functioning proﬁ  le of payment and settlement 
systems.
The liquidity demand is becoming concentrated at 
critical times during the day, such as when a key 
system requires payments to settle, in particular 
in the RTGS system which is the backbone of the 
payment organisation. Peak liquidity demands can 
come from the need to fund payments at speciﬁ  c 
times on different systems.
The ﬁ  rst example can be drawn from the funding needs 
relating to the continuous linked settlement (CLS) 
system for foreign exchange transactions. At the end 
of 2007, CLS Bank is connected to 15 RTGS systems 
to allow its members to fund their positions, which 
has to be done within stringent schedules, in order 
to address the time zone differences between the 
different currency areas involved.
A second example is the growing implementation by 
central counterparties (CCPs) for securities and/or 
derivatives of the internationally recognised best 
practices, recommending to have the authority and 
the operational capacity to make intraday margin 
calls. The objective is to better capture price volatility 
or exceptional increases of exposures of trading 
positions during the day. One example of such recent 
development is the Intraday margin call project, 
implemented by LCH.Clearnet SA in Spring 2007. 
The arrangement focuses on intraday margin solution 
in derivatives markets as these are considered the 
most volatile in risk proﬁ  le intraday. The recourse to 
intraday margin calls by CCPs requires participants 
to be able to transfer enough liquidity or collateral to 
the CCP within a very short notice intraday.
A third example is the increasing recourse to 
arrangements aimed at preventing consequences 
of settlement risk in DNS. Pursuant to internationally 
agreed standards applicable to both payment 
systems and securities settlement systems (SSSs), 
DNS systems should implement a mechanism that 
ensures timely settlement, even in the event of a 
participant’s default.3 
3  See Core Principle V for Systemically important payment systems (BIS, February 2001) and recommendation No 9 of the CPSS/IOSCO report on securities settlement 
systems (BIS, November 2001).ARTICLES
Frédéric Hervo: “Recent developments in intraday liquidity in payment and settlement systems”
Banque de France ￿ Financial Stability Review – Special issue on liquidity ￿ No. 11 ￿ February 2008  153
Among the different practices to implement such 
an arrangement to protect DNS systems against 
settlement risks, a possibility is to combine a 
permanent mutual fund, which amount is based 
upon average debit balances in the system, with 
complementary individual and temporary collateral 
for participants whose transactions would exceed 
the total amount of the permanent common fund. 
Combination of a mutual fund and individual 
additional collateral minimises opportunity costs 
in the level of the mutual fund, since exceptional 
peaks are covered by individual collateral. At the 
same time, it requires a more dynamic intraday 
liquidity management of participants and a close 
real time monitoring of the intraday evolution of 
their position in the related DNS system, in order to 
avoid that individual transactions are queued because 
of insufﬁ  cient collateral. 
One relevant example of such ﬁ  nancial protection 
arrangement combining a mutual fund supplemented 
by individual collateral could be found in the previous 
revocable channel of the Euroclear France RGV2 SSS, 
which was decommissioned in November 2007, to 
be replaced by the ESES France SSS operating on 
a DVP model 1 basis for all types of transactions. 
This SSS used to process non-urgent transactions 
and operated on the basis of a multilateral netting 
of the cash leg of transactions. In order to bring the 
revocable channel of RGV2 into compliance with 
CPSS/IOSCO Recommendation 9, an arrangement 
was set in February 2005, consisting of caps on 
participants’ buying positions, secured by a permanent 
mutual fund of over EUR 400 million, supplemented 
when necessary by individual collateral (i.e. collateral 
allocated strictly to cover the short cash position of the 
participant concerned). The arrangement was aimed at 
ensuring timely settlement of transactions, including 
in the event of an inability to settle by the participant 
with the largest single settlement obligation.4 
Beyond the evolutions that have increased liquidity 
peaks at speciﬁ  c parts of the day, another trend is the 
extension of the operating times of systems, in order 
to take into account the interdependencies between 
them. For instance to achieve DVP settlement 
of securities transactions, market participants 
need to access both the securities and payments 
infrastructure. Accordingly, synchronisation of the 
opening hours and cut-off times for settlement has 
often been achieved in order to ensure the smooth 
functioning of the market. One relevant example is 
for SSSs processing Eurosystem eligible collateral 
to have operating hours in compliance with NCBs 
requirements for TARGET.5
However, synchronisation of operational processes 
across systems in different countries and currency 
areas is a more recent phenomenon. At the time 
of implementation of CLS, the synchronisation of 
payment system processes was addressed, and some 
payment systems adapted their operating hours to 
meet the requirements of the CLS pay-in schedule. One 
of the major challenges in this context is overcoming 
the time-zone frictions that exist between, the 
Asian, the European and the American time-zones.
Extension of operating hours and synchronisation 
with other domestic or cross-border systems 
has strongly constrained intraday liquidity and 
collateral management, since it requires an efﬁ  cient 
management so that timely transfer of liquidity 
resulting from settlement proceeds in one system 
is able to meet liquidity needs in another system.
1|2  Evolution of ﬁ  nancing sources
Financing sources available to feed intraday liquidity 
needs have also evolved during the past years. 
An important distinction can be made depending 
on the settlement asset used, i.e. central bank money 
and commercial bank money. Developments in 
collateral policies have also signiﬁ  cantly affected 
intraday liquidity management.
RELATION BETWEEN CENTRAL BANK MONEY 
AND COMMERCIAL BANK MONEY 
Payment and settlement systems can settle either in 
central bank money or in commercial bank money.
When central bank money is used as the settlement 
asset, the ﬁ  rst component of intraday liquidity takes 
the form of deposits with the central bank that can 
be used to make payments during the day.
4  See Sampic (C.) and Hervo (F.) (2003): “Protection of deferred net payment and securities settlement systems: the examples of SIT and Relit”, Banque de 
France, Financial Stability Review, No 3, November.
5   See “Standards for the use of EU Securities Settlement Systems” in ESCB Credit Operations –EMI, January 1998.ARTICLES
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The intraday balance is also impacted by proceeds 
of settlement of payments with other participants 
all along the operating day.
If the intraday balance available for payments is 
too small relative to the value of payments to be 
made in a given time, it could result in gridlock, 
preventing payments from being executed. Thus in 
many cases central banks provide intraday credit to 
banks and other eligible account holders. Indeed, 
particularly with the decline in importance of reserve 
requirements in many economies, balances held by 
banks during the day are often substantially larger 
than those held overnight.
The smooth and safe functioning of a payment system 
is dependent not just on the quantity of the settlement 
asset. It also depends crucially on the quality of the 
asset and thus on the identity of the settlement agent. 
Therefore, international best practices recommend 
payment and settlement systems to use the central 
bank of issue as the settlement agent, providing the 
safest settlement asset.
However, in an era of financial globalisation, 
global players, active in multiple currencies, are 
confronted with the fact that each central bank 
provides as settlement asset only the currency it 
issues. This is one reason why systems providing 
multi-currency settlement services usually use 
commercial bank money as settlement asset. 
For example, the International Central Securities 
Depositories, Euroclear Bank and Clearstream 
Banking Luxembourg which service international 
markets and participants, provide settlement in 
multiple currencies in commercial bank money. 
The use of commercial bank money raises speciﬁ  c 
liquidity risks in relation with the transferability of 
the private settlement asset in claims denominated 
in central bank money. 
Central banks can address some of the consequences 
of globalisation through mutual co-operation. 
For example, in the mid-nineties, central banks 
expressed their preference for a market solution to 
address the need to reduce principal risk in foreign 
exchange settlement. CLS was launched in 2002, 
with support of the international central banking 
community. In 2007, the system provides payment 
versus payment  (PVP) settlement in 15 major 
currencies which are eligible in the system. CLS Bank 
is the settlement institution for CLS, i.e. settlement is 
not in central bank money. However, all payments to 
and from CLS are made through the issuing central 
bank, so central bank money retains a pivotal role in 
the settlement of foreign exchange transactions in CLS. 
CLS illustrates the clear trend towards the 
development of commercial money settlement 
backed by funding in central bank money (CHIPS 
in the US is another relevant example, with initial and 
ﬁ  nal funding done in central bank money) or other 
innovative arrangements aimed at limiting the use of 
central bank money to a net funding (e.g. Clearstream 
settlement model or Euroclear future alternative 
payment model). The consequences of this type 
of settlement models in terms of intraday liquidity 
management are complex. On the one hand, the level 
of funding in central bank money appears very limited 
in quantitative terms, compared to the underlying 
value of payment obligations settled in commercial 
bank money. On the other hand, a strong settlement 
interdependency is introduced between the settlement 
system in commercial bank money and the payment 
system(s) used to fund the net obligations in central 
bank money. This requires from the banks a very 
close monitoring of the completion of their funding 
obligations, typically within tight intraday deadlines.
CENTRAL BANK INTRADAY CREDIT 
AND COLLATERAL POLICIES
Intraday credit policies
There is some variation in central bank policies as 
regards which institutions are eligible to be provided 
Figure 1
Stylized diagram of central bank money
(y-axis: value; x-axis: time)
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Source: BIS (2003): The role of central bank money in payment systems, 
August.ARTICLES
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with intraday credit in RTGS systems.6 Besides resident 
banks, which are commonly eligible to intra-day 
and overnight credit, there is less uniformity about 
providing credit to non-bank ﬁ  nancial institutions 
(e.g. clearing houses or other settlement systems 
operators, investment ﬁ  rms and brokers…). Intra-day 
credit is generally provided only to a limited set 
of account holders, where necessary to ensure 
the orderly ﬂ  ow of payments. This automatically 
introduces a level of tiering in systems since for 
many institutions, direct access to a payment 
system may be of little or no use without access to 
credit. This has in turn consequences on liquidity 
management with direct participants having a broad 
access to intraday credit facility with the central bank 
providing clearing settlement services to other parties 
willing to use the system to expedite payments.
Where central banks provide credit they are potentially 
exposed to credit risk and consequently they require 
collateral, set limits and/or charge fees. Most central 
banks extend credit only against collateral.7 This is 
the case with the Eurosystem which grants unlimited, 
interest rate free but fully collateralised intraday credit 
to eligible counterparties participating in TARGET. 
Actually, monetary policy considerations are also 
important when designing a central bank policy 
with regards to intraday credit. The failure to repay 
intraday credit by close of business may lead to 
“spillover” into overnight credit. This might threaten 
the implementation of monetary policy, either in 
case intraday credit has been granted to institutions 
that are not monetary policy counterparties8 or in 
a crisis situation. Actually, the amount of intraday 
credit may average several times the whole amount 
of liquidity provided overnight or longer through 
regular monetary policy. A massive spillover of 
intra-day credit into overnight credit may accordingly 
create short term disturbances in the conduct of 
monetary policy operations. However, central banks 
which provide fully collateralised intraday credit 
would become the owner of the collateral, in case one 
or some participants ultimately failed to reimburse 
credit or became insolvent. The possibility to liquidate 
the collateral would not only protect central banks 
against credit risk but also limit the impact of the 
spillover to the time needed to sell/realize the assets.
Diversiﬁ  cation of eligible collateral
The collateral policy of the central banks inﬂ  uences the 
costs of the liquidity. Since most central banks extend 
credit only against collateral, the type of collateral that 
the participants of the payment systems can use is an 
important factor in determining the opportunity costs 
of holding collateral. In general, in the past decade most 
central banks have broadened the range of collateral 
they accept in their provision of intraday liquidity. 
The collateral framework of the Eurosystem is one 
relevant example of a responsive policy to market 
innovations and developments. ESCB statutes state 
that any provision of liquidity (monetary policy or 
intraday) should be fully collateralised by adequate 
assets. At the beginning of Stage III of the Economic 
and Monetary Union in 1999, a two tier approach 
was followed. Tier 1 assets were based upon criteria 
common to the whole euro area whereas Tier 2 assets 
complied with national eligibility criteria. Irrespective 
of the difference in eligibility criteria, both Tier 1 
and Tier 2 assets were eligible to collateralise any 
provision of liquidity (monetary policy or intraday) 
and were usable both on a domestic or cross-border 
basis within the euro area.
The financial industry expressed, in a public 
consultation made in 2003 a request to improve the 
collateral framework, including a desire to expand 
further the range of eligible assets. The Eurosystem 
took these views into account when it was decided to 
implement a phased approach towards a single list of 
eligible assets (implemented between Mid 2005 and 
1st January 2007). The single list of Eurosystem eligible 
assets comprises a wide range of collateral, including 
marketable assets (e.g. public bonds) as well as non 
marketable assets, especially credit claims complying 
with an eligibility credit assessment framework.
TRENDS IN COMMERCIAL BANK MONEY FINANCING
Recent developments in commercial bank money 
intraday ﬁ  nancing comprise the design of diverse 
intra-group organisations in order to better address 
liquidity and collateral management in a more 
global ﬁ  nancial environment as well as the starting 
emergence of some intraday interbank market. 
6  See BIS (2003): “The role of central bank money in payment systems”, August. 
7  The intraday credit policy of the US Federal Reserve Bank System is based upon a different framework, allowing eligible institutions to obtain a maximum amount 
of uncollateralised daylight overdraft (“single day net debit cap”) charged with a daily fee and above this limit an additional amount of collateralised credit 
(“Collateralised capacity”).
8  Which is not a widespread practice of central banks.ARTICLES
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Internationally active institutions with a signiﬁ  cant 
presence in a large number of countries manage 
their intraday liquidity and the related collateral 
in a variety of ways.9 It seems that a large number 
of internationally active banks operate primarily 
through correspondent banking relationships, 
accessing only a select group of markets directly 
and often managing their network of nostro agents 
on a partially centralised basis. 
Of the small group of banks with a high level of direct 
participation in international payment systems, few 
operate with a fully centralised liquidity and collateral 
management function. Several others are partially 
centralised, managing liquidity on a regional basis. 
The degree of centralisation of the liquidity and 
collateral management function tends to be driven by 
one or more of several factors: cost-efﬁ  ciency, local 
regulatory and access factors, technological capacity 
and the degree of integration of IT systems across 
the banking group as well as the bank’s particular 
contingency arrangements. In particular, banks with 
sizeable operations in multiple markets perceive the 
greatest scale economies from centralisation, with 
technological capacity and group-level contingency 
planning providing an additional level of comfort. 
Other banks seem to consider that a decentralised 
liquidity and collateral management approach also 
supports business continuity planning, ensuring 
diversiﬁ  cation of collateral and liquidity sources in 
the event of an emergency.
There is also some evidence of banks’ implementation 
of in-house liquidity –and collateral– saving payment 
management techniques to mitigate intraday liquidity 
risk pressures. Examples involve queue release 
algorithms or internal schedulers to manage the 
ﬂ  ow of payments and prioritise obligations.
Surveys conducted at regional or international 
levels regarding provision of credit in the context of 
correspondent banking services seem to indicate that 
intraday overdraft limits are generally uncollateralised 
and can be quite large, while overnight overdrafts are 
comparatively small. In case of default of participants in 
correspondent banking arrangements, such overdrafts 
could accordingly become a vector for domino effects. 
However, to the extent that credit lines offered also 
tend to be uncommitted, correspondent banks would 
quickly cut or suspend credit lines, in case of need. 
This would allow the correspondent banks to keep control 
of their credit risk but might also precipitate or amplify 
the consequences of a crisis (e.g. suspension of credit 
lines due to a misperception of an operational incident 
affecting a major bank using correspondent agents to 
expedite its settlement activities in away systems).
Traditionally, intraday credit provided in correspondent 
bank services has been free of interest. However, there 
is some anecdotal evidence that an interbank intraday 
liquidity market seems to start emerging in relation 
with concentration of correspondent banking activities 
and funding costs related to critical time windows. 
The introduction of CLS in particular has triggered a 
move towards greater concentration of correspondent 
activity into those banks that are direct participants 
in, or act as nostro agents for CLS. In relation with the 
time criticality of funding obligations related to CLS, 
those banks have started to charge intraday liquidity.
OVERVIEW OF INTRADAY CREDIT IN PARIS MARKET 
PLACE SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS
The following diagram provides an illustration of the 
respective importance of payment ﬂ  ows compared to 
the real economy (the ratio between the daily turnover 
in payment and settlement systems averages 56% of 
the annual GDP; in other words, two days turnover 
in payment and settlement systems is equivalent to 
the annual GDP in value).
The amount of intraday credit required to settle the 
payment and settlement obligations averages 16% 
of the daily turnover in value.
9 See  Cross-border collateral arrangements report – CPSS BIS, January 2006.
Figure 2
Intraday credit and settlement ﬂ  ows – 
Paris ﬁ  nancial centre
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Intraday credit granted by Banque de France is ten 
times higher than the overnight and longer term 
credit provided to the banks. 
In this context, the smooth functioning of payment and 
settlement systems appears all the more important 
that a major problem preventing reimbursement of 
intraday credit at the end of the day would lead to a 
spillover to overnight credit.
2|   FINANCIAL STABILITY 
IMPLICATIONS
The developments affecting intraday liquidity 
management with shortening of the time horizon 
in a more complex settlement landscape need to 
be adequately considered from a ﬁ  nancial stability 
perspective. It is necessary to understand the evolution 
of risks, which differ depending on the settlement 
model used but also on the evolution of the global 
ﬁ  nancial environment, charaterized by a concentration 
of actors and growth of settlement interdependencies. 
Over the past decade, the relevant actors, including 
the banking sector, the banking supervisors and 
central banks have taken various initiatives to 
better approach changes in intraday liquidity risk.
2|1   Risks associated to intraday 
liquidity management
CHANGING FORMS OF LIQUIDITY RISK
Liquidity risk in payment systems differs depending 
on the settlement model used. 
In DNS systems, ﬁ  nality of settlement is only achieved 
at the end of the day (or end of settlement cycle) and 
thus there is no certainty that the payments will be 
settled timely. If one participant fails to meet its 
payment obligation when due, the whole processed 
payment orders could be unwound and new balances 
excluding the defaulter would have to be presented 
for a new attempt for settlement. Liquidity risk 
would therefore arise from an unforeseen change 
in the liquidity position of the different participants, 
particularly those that expect to be creditors in the 
system. This situation would force them to seek other 
funding resources, which could give rise to strains on 
the interbank market, with potential repercussions 
on the conduct of the monetary policy. 
This situation generates the consequent risk of 
other participants defaulting in turn because of 
unexpected debit position to be covered late in the 
day. The liquidity risk would become systemic if, 
by a spillover effect, the inability of an institution 
to settle its net balance in one system generates a 
failure in other systems. Thus, in DNS systems, the 
liquidity risk rather materialises end-of-day than 
intraday, when it appears implicit.
The earlier ﬁ  nality occurs (i.e. a payment becomes 
unconditional and irrevocable) the lower is the 
risk of unexpected credit exposures arising in the 
settlement process. This has been a main driver to 
develop real-time gross settlement (RTGS payment 
systems and DVP model 1 for securities transactions). 
However, in systems operating on the basis of gross 
settlement, there is a risk that insufﬁ  cient liquidity 
creates queued payments. Should they accumulate, 
this may generate gridlocks and eventually failed 
payments (and/or deliveries) at the end of the day. 
To a certain extent, risk mitigation measures aimed 
at preventing credit risk through the development of 
gross settlement has translated in higher liquidity risk 
(which can be in turn mitigated through innovative 
liquidity saving features described in section 1|1 
Development of innovative liquidity saving features in 
payment and settlement systems).
CONCENTRATION OF INTRADAY LIQUIDITY RISKS
The continuing consolidation of the ﬁ  nancial sector 
has led to a signiﬁ  cant concentration of payments 
activities and associated exposures within individual 
banks. There is anecdotal evidence that a few banks 
process on their own books very high payment 
values –in some cases similar to those of LVPSs. 
Such concentrations may arise for various reasons 
such as consolidation between banks, specialisation 
by certain banks in correspondent banking, or 
changes in cost structures that encourage indirect 
rather than direct participation in payment systems. 
In Europe, payment ﬂ  ows passing through the leading 
correspondent banks attain values comparable to 
those observed in certain national payment systems.
The process of adapting correspondent banking 
and custody services to the context of ﬁ  nancial ARTICLES
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globalisation has sometimes resulted in similarities 
between these arrangements and payment and 
settlement systems, giving birth to quasi-systems. 
Some banks provide services for a substantial number 
of other banks and ﬁ  nancial intermediaries for which 
the use of a correspondent or custodian bank is an 
alternative to direct access to a system. 
Lastly, corresponding and custodian banks which 
have a critical mass of customers and ﬂ  ows can settle 
transactions internally; in other words, they can 
make payments and deliver securities from account 
to account between their customers without going 
through payment and settlement systems. Recent 
regulatory developments, e.g. the implementation of 
the EU Directive 2004/39/EC on market in ﬁ  nancial 
instruments (“MiFID”) in the European Union is probably 
putting new emphasis on this trend with large banks that 
develop internal systems competing with infrastructures.
These developments inﬂ  uence the form of intra-day 
liquidity risk, leading to a concentration and 
internalisation of ﬂ  ows in commercial bank money 
outside the payment and settlement systems.
IMPACT OF SETTLEMENT INTERDEPENDENCIES 
ON LIQUIDITY RISK 
During the past decade, the forms of 
interdependencies between payment and settlement 
systems have signiﬁ  cantly increased and changed, 
primarily within the settlement infrastructure 
of a said country or currency area but also on a 
cross-border basis.
The consolidation and globalisation of the ﬁ  nancial 
sector has resulted in the emergence of a few 
global ﬁ  nancial institutions acting as common and 
signiﬁ  cant participants in multiple systems operating 
in several countries. They may also play different 
roles, as settlement banks, liquidity providers, 
and collateral custodians to the same systems in 
which they are typically among largest participants. 
This creates institution-based interdependencies 
between payment and settlement systems.
Other forms of interdependencies that may inﬂ  uence 
liquidity management are related to the direct 
settlement relations between systems (e.g. between 
SSSs and payment systems to achieve DVP in securities 
settlements and to collateralise extensions of intra-day 
credit in payment systems). Interdependencies can 
facilitate signiﬁ  cant improvements in the safety and 
efﬁ  ciency of payment and settlement processes. 
DVP and PVP processes, for example, have led to a 
signiﬁ  cant reduction in the principal risk otherwise 
associated with the settlement of securities and 
foreign exchange transactions. 
Interdependencies, however, have also substantial 
consequences regarding the form of liquidity risk and 
accordingly on the liquidity and collateral management 
of participants in payment and settlement systems.
In particular, as systems and system participants 
become more dependent on the smooth functioning of 
one system to meet liquidity or collateral demands in 
another system, the risk that a ﬁ  nancial or operational 
disruption in one system may have an impact on 
another system and its participants also increases.
The increasing interdependence of liquidity ﬂ  ows 
among systems has lead to a more complex liquidity 
management for systems’ participants, in order to avoid 
the creation of unbalance between liquidity traps in 
some systems and liquidity shortages in other systems.
2|2   Lessons drawn from recent 
turmoil on ﬁ  nancial markets 
In the context of the recent turmoil that affected 
ﬁ  nancial markets in the summer 2007, many payment 
and settlement systems and their participants faced a 
variety of challenges in the conduct of their settlement 
operations. These challenges comprised increased 
trading volumes and asset price volatility, as well as the 
consequences on systems of institutions’ precautions 
against liquidity and credit risk. These challenges 
were generally well met and consequently payment 
and settlement systems functioned smoothly. 
Regarding more speciﬁ  cally intraday liquidity and 
collateral management, several lessons can be drawn 
from this period of strains.
Counterparty credit concerns that became manifest 
in money markets did not significantly affect 
institutions’ willingness to meet their payment 
and settlement obligations on a timely basis. In 
particular timely settlement was preserved for 
systems operating in the Paris ﬁ  nancial centre.ARTICLES
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Neither spillover from intraday to overnight credit, 
nor any increase in end-of-day failed/unsettled 
payments were ascertained. Figures do not even 
show any intraday gridlock or delay in the interval 
between the submission of payment orders and their 
actual settlement, compared to the normal time lags 
observed.
However, one important behaviour that was observed 
in most systems, including in the ones operating 
in the Paris ﬁ  nancial centre were related to the 
precautionary demands for central bank liquidity. 
Actually, ﬁ  nancial institutions’ increased aversion to 
credit and liquidity risk also affected payment and 
settlement systems. The difﬁ  culties in money markets 
led ﬁ  nancial institutions to increase signiﬁ  cantly the 
amount of collateral pledged to central banks for 
potential intraday and overnight credit. 
The level of intraday credit provided by central banks 
also increased somewhat. This primarily reﬂ  ects 
the precautionary actions of ﬁ  nancial institutions, 
rather than an increase in actual intraday liquidity 
needs. At the same time, central banks’ provision of 
overnight and longer term funds alleviated some of 
this increased demand for intraday credit.
As with the other challenges, the precautionary steps 
taken by institutions, ascertained by the additional 
central bank liquidity required did not result in visible 
negative implications for the functioning of systems. 
Central banks were able to process these additional 
collateral deliveries, and institutions apparently found 
sufﬁ  cient collateral to pledge to the central bank. 
As far as central bank policies are concerned, an 
important lesson relates to the need of having a list 
of eligible assets that is diversiﬁ  ed enough to address 
an unexpected increase in collateral demand. 
This requirement was achieved in several ways. In the 
euro area, the existing collateral policy of the Eurosystem 
results in many institutions having high levels of diverse 
types of collateral already posted, or ready to be posted to 
one or more central banks to face increased demand for 
liquidity. In that context, the provision of extra collateral 
was processed without much difﬁ  culty. Several other 
central banks met this demand allowing some ﬂ  exibility 
in expanding their collateral lists in light of the turmoil. 
Chart 3
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Total settled value and total liquidity usage 
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Another lesson is related to the strong relation between 
operational risk and liquidity risk. The question 
raised is whether the system design allows the 
mitigation of liquidity strains in preventing for 
instance the development of liquidity sinks in case of 
an operational problem at one of a major participant.
2|3   Initiatives to better mitigate 
intraday liquidity risks
In order to better address the intraday liquidity risks 
in a moving environment characterized by increased 
constraints in terms of systems interdependencies and 
shortening of the time horizon, policies and practices 
have been developed both by the banking sector and 
by the central banks and other public authorities.
INITIATIVES DEVELOPED BY THE BANKING SECTOR
In the past decade, the banking sector has taken 
several initiatives to address effectively liquidity risk 
while minimising the costs of managing payment 
liquidity in a global environment. 
One example is the Guidelines on liquidity management 
released by the European Banking Federation in 1999, 
to take into account the new environment resulting 
from the implementation of TARGET in the EU. 
Other relevant examples are the reports 
released in 2003 and 2005 by the Payments Risk 
Committee (PRC),10 a private sector group sponsored 
by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York on which 
many of the largest global banks are represented. 
The PRC recommended central banks to further 
harmonise their collateral policy. It also recommended 
individual institutions to develop well-constructed 
intraday liquidity collateralised services, (such as 
intraday real-time repos, cross-border collateral 
pool facilities and intraday currency and collateral 
swaps). The PRC advocated that obstacles to moving 
collateral across borders in support of such liquidity 
services should be eliminated. In a second report, 
the PRC detailed the different market solutions, as 
well as the role that some market infrastructures 
(e.g. CLS and ICSDs – International central securities 
depository) could play for their implementation.
THE ROLE OF CENTRAL BANKS AND SUPERVISORS
Central banks inﬂ  uence payment and settlement systems 
by providing a variety of services to commercial banks. 
In doing so, central banks provide a safe settlement asset: 
the central bank money. In most cases, they also operate 
systems which allow for the transfer of that settlement 
asset. Central banks have also developed oversight 
responsibility over payment and settlement systems. 
Therefore, central bank responses to the new challenges 
regarding intraday liquidity comprise the provision of 
systems offering liquidity saving features, the adaptation 
of their policy in the area of access to central bank 
money and collateral eligibility, as well as oversight 
initiatives to better capture the moving liquidity risk.
Most RTGS systems recently developed by the central banks 
encompass liquidity saving features. The new TARGET2 
platform which has been launched on 19 November 2007 
is one relevant example of the new RTGS generation 
offering state-of-the-art liquidity saving features.
Improvements in the collateral policy and in the tools 
to mobilise more easily eligible assets also facilitate 
banks to better manage their collateral and to get 
more easily the central bank money they need. 
Recent turmoil demonstrated a preference for central 
bank money. Actors that do not have access to central 
bank’s reﬁ  nancing are in a more difﬁ  cult situation as 
they are dependant on banks for reﬁ  nancing.
Cross-border use of collateral either on a routine 
or on an emergency-only basis may be an effective 
policy response to alleviate collateral pressure. In the 
Eurosystem, there is extensive use of cross-border 
collateral among the euro area countries, although 
this is limited to euro-denominated collateral assets 
issued in the European economic area (EEA) and 
settled/held in the euro area.
A few central banks accept collateral denominated in 
foreign currency. Several central banks (in Sweden, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States) have already introduced such facilities and 
have adopted a range of approaches to accepting 
these assets. The existing arrangements vary from 
emergency-only facilities through infrequently used 
routine cross-border collateral arrangements to 
arrangements used extensively on a routine basis.
10   Managing payment liquidity in global markets: risk issues and solutions, Payments Risk Committee, March 2003 and Global payment liquidity – private 
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Box 1
Liquidity saving features in advanced payment systems: TARGET2’s example
TARGET2 is a relevant example of a system providing its users with the most up-to-date liquidity management tools 
currently offered in RTGS systems. TARGET2 combines the following liquidity-saving patterns:
• consolidated monitoring of the liquidity position in all RTGS accounts of a credit institution across Europe, thanks 
to TARGET2’s architecture, consisting of a single shared platform. Multi-country banks are able to manage the activity of 
their branches from a single point and to centralise their cash management, which will include the liquidity involved in the 
settlement of ancillary systems – as settlement of these systems will be performed over RTGS accounts after a transition 
period (maximum 4 years after TARGET2 go-live);
• liquidity pooling functionality based on the concept of the virtual account, which purpose is the intraday aggregation 
of the liquidity available on all the single accounts belonging to a group of accounts of a said banking group. Its liquidity 
can be managed in a consolidated way. Each transaction involving an account belonging to a group of account will be 
immediately booked on the relevant single account using the global liquidity available at the group of accounts level; this 
global liquidity available is deﬁ  ned as the sum of balances of all the 
• RTGS accounts belonging to the group of accounts (plus the sum of all the credits lines, if any, of all the RTGS accounts 
belonging to the group of accounts);
• different priority levels that can be assigned to each payment depending on its criticality; 
• possibility to use a liquidity reservation feature in order to facilitate the settlement of participants’ operations, including 
the ability to set aside liquidity on speciﬁ  c sub-accounts especially  in order to dedicate it to the settlement of transactions 
stemming from ancillary systems;
• bilateral and multilateral sending limit features offered in order to avoid that some participants are inclined to wait for 
receiving payments from their counterparties before issuing their own payments. Setting a bilateral limit vis-à-vis a participant 
prevents the settlement of payments that would cause the bilateral balance with this participant to breach this limit. Setting 
a multilateral limit prevents the settlement of payments that would cause the balance vis-à-vis all the participants towards 
whom no bilateral limit was set to breach this multilateral limit. Thanks to the multilateral limit feature, there is no need for 
participants to manage bilateral limits towards each other (TARGET2 should have around 1,000 direct participants);
• optimisation mechanisms which aim at reducing participants’ liquidity needs while improving the ﬂ  uidity of 
settlements. 
–  Offsetting processes that are triggered by the arrival of a transaction in the system. They attempt to immediately settle 
this transaction, in combination with already queued transactions;
–  ﬁ  ve optimisation processes. The ﬁ  rst three of them are applied to payments placed in the queue (normal priority) and are 
sequentially triggered throughout the day. The other two correspond to speciﬁ  c settlement methods for ancillary systems.
Effect of bilateral limits on normal priority payments
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11  See BIS (2006): “Report on cross-border collateral arrangements”.
12  See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) (2000): “Report of the Sound Practices for managing liquidity in banking organisations”, February
Given the different needs and arrangements among 
the central banks, a full harmonization of the policies 
regarding collateral eligibility and mobilization practices 
does not seem feasible. However, further cooperation 
between central banks may be desirable to address 
possible common needs (e.g. responding to emergency 
liquidity situations), ensure readiness to respond to 
future challenges and facilitate individual projects of 
some central banks to further develop cross-border 
collateral facilities that may be used for routine or 
emergency credit, or both.11 
From an oversight perspective, it seems important that 
central banks in cooperation with other relevant public 
authorities are in a position to adequately address the 
changing nature of the liquidity risk.
A ﬁ  rst area relates to the ability to monitor developments 
and risks affecting liquidity in payment and settlement 
systems. Several tools are used to analyse and forecast 
developments, including simulation models.
A second area is to develop oversight analysis and 
eventually speciﬁ  c requirements with respect to 
intra-day liquidity risk.
Intraday liquidity risk issues are of a common interest 
between banking supervisors, who are in charge of 
the prudential safety of the ﬁ  nancial institutions, 
participating in payment and settlement systems 
and central banks, entitled to ensure the smooth 
functioning of these systems. In this respect, 
coordinated actions between central banks and 
banking supervisors have helped strengthening the 
resilience of both banks and payment systems.
Supervisory requirements and recommendations 
have increasingly recognised that developments 
affecting payment and settlement systems have 
lead to a situation where the relevant time-frame for 
active liquidity management is generally quite short, 
including intraday liquidity.12 
For instance, the Principle 9 set by the Basel Committee 
regarding Contingency Planning states that a bank 
should have contingency plans in place that address 
the strategy for handling liquidity crises and include 
procedures for making up cash ﬂ  ow shortfalls in 
emergency situations. It could be interesting to 
investigate further whether banks’ contingency funding 
plans and stress tests adequately reﬂ  ect intraday 
liquidity risks, including the potential for sudden and 
unexpected changes in liquidity or collateral needs. 
Another issue is related to the regulatory approach with 
respect to developments in correspondent banking and 
custody business. A number of central banks have been 
working to better understand the risks issues, in relation 
with internalisation and concentration of ﬂ  ows. But large 
correspondents and custodians are also commercial 
banks that are subject to banking supervision. Thus, 
it is useful that central bank overseers and banking 
supervisors monitor and assess in cooperation the 
management of potential risks related to the evolution 
of correspondent and custody activities for the smooth 
functioning of the payment and settlement process.ARTICLES
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Box 2
Attempt to simulate and modelizing intraday liquidity risks
Recently, several central banks have developed simulation tools able to reproduce the operation of payment systems 
using real payment data. 
These new tools allow the different central banks to conduct several stress-testing exercises, as a part of their oversight 
mission. In particular, payment system simulators are especially helpful to investigate the issue of liquidity risk in RTGS 
systems. In such systems, an operational problem affecting the IT infrastructure of a large participant could prevent the 
considered participant from emitting any payment, while it would still receive payments from its counterparties. The affected 
participant would thus turn into a «liquidity sink» for the system, depriving the RTGS of its liquidity and consequently, 
threatening the smooth functioning of the system. Possible consequences include the rejection of payments at the end of 
the day, or a substantial increase in the average settlement delay. 
Simulation tools allow central banks to quantify those consequences, and help them to deﬁ  ne the most appropriate oversight 
policies to face this issue.1 In particular, which participants should be requested to have a secondary processing site and 
how many contingency payments per hour should the system operator be able to make on behalf of an affected participant, 
are important questions, to which a payment system simulator can help provide an answer.
1  Mazars (E.) and Woelfel (G.) (2005): “Analysis, by simulation, of the impact of a technical default of a payment system participant”, Banque de France, 
Financial Stability Review, No 6, June.